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The Tort-Proof Plaintiff
THE DRUNK IN THE AUTOMOBILE, CRASHWORTHINESS
CLAIMS, AND THE RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS
Ellen M. Bublick†
State courts face a difficult challenge when they review
crashworthiness claims that arise in conjunction with drunk driving.
Under ordinary doctrines of crashworthiness, if a product defect causes
enhanced injury, the product seller is subject to liability for the enhanced
portion of the injury.1 For example, if an airbag fails to deploy during a
car accident, the car maker may be required to compensate for increased
injury caused by the defect.2
At the same time, courts are increasingly asked to apportion
responsibility among all tortfeasors involved in a single injury. Although
apportionment traditionally included only negligent torts, in the last
decade a growing number of states have expanded the divisors to include
strict liability, recklessness, and even intentional torts.3
In a claim involving both crashworthiness and drunk driving the
two sets of doctrines—crashworthiness liability and comparative
apportionment—appear set for a collision course. The liability that one
doctrine provides, the other takes away. The mechanism through which
this conflict is created works as follows: juries in crashworthiness cases
involving drunk drivers are asked to determine the defendants’ liability
to the plaintiff, but also are asked to compare the responsibility of the car
maker that produced the defective airbag with that of the drunk driver
†

Dan B. Dobbs Professor of Law, University of Arizona James E. Rogers College of
Law. Thanks to Aaron Twerski for inviting me to consider this engaging topic, and to Anita
Bernstein and the Brooklyn Law School for hosting this thought-provoking conference. Thanks also
to Barbara Atwood, Kathie Barnes, Mark Geistfeld, Mark Jacobs, Ellen Jacobs and Brent White for
comments on an earlier draft, to Tim Reppucci for his excellent research assistance, and to the
editors of the Brooklyn Law Review for their careful work.
1
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 16(a) (1998). In certain cases, if
proof does not support determination of the enhanced harm, the manufacturer may be liable for all of
plaintiff’s harm. Id. § 16(c).
2
See, e.g., Estep v. Mike Ferrell Ford Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 672 S.E.2d 345, 355 (W.
Va. 2008) (holding that evidence by engineer was sufficient to support finding that truck in which
airbag failed to deploy during accident was defective); Batiste v. General Motors Corp., 802 So. 2d
686, 689-90 (La. App. 2001) (holding that expert testimony was required to show that properly
functioning airbag would have deployed and res ipsa loquitur did not apply).
3
See generally Ellen M. Bublick, The End Game of Tort Reform: Comparative
Apportionment and Intentional Torts, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 355, 364-67 (2003) (tracking the
development of comparative apportionment).
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who caused the initial accident. Given a comparative metric that uses
fault as a central measure4 and requires zero-sum trade-offs of
responsibility, the moral blame inherent in a reckless tort like drunk
driving may simply swamp the apportionment process. Even if a jury
finds that the manufacturer’s product is not crashworthy and that the
defective product led to enhanced injury, the product seller’s liability
may be buried under the moral blame assigned to the drunk driver in the
apportionment.
Accordingly, crashworthiness cases involving drunk drivers
present one instance of a crucial but newly configured challenge in tort
law: how to preserve the structural accountability of negligent and
strictly liable tortfeasors within an apportionment system that is not only
dominated by several liability, but for the first time in the long history of
tort law, apportions responsibility not only to negligent actors but to
strictly liable, reckless, and intentional wrongdoers as well.
The problem of preserving structural accountability after strict
liability, reckless, and intentional torts are added to the comparative
apportionment mix is not a problem exclusive to the case of the drunk
driver and the automobile.5 Indeed, the concern permeates many contexts
in which the high moral blame of one actor can unmake the systemic
responsibility for care of another.6 Nevertheless, vanishing structural
liability—creating tort-proof plaintiffs through apportionment—is wellillustrated by and inadequately addressed in this setting.
The term “tort-proof plaintiff” recalls an analogous doctrine
from mid-1970s defamation law: the libel-proof plaintiff. The libel-proof
plaintiff was a person whose reputation was so poor that even actionable
false and defamatory statements heaped on could not count as extra
damage.7 When a drunk driver is the crashworthiness plaintiff, the tortproof plaintiff analogy is most complete. When the plaintiff’s
misconduct is highly blameworthy in itself, as in the case of drunk
driving, why should even actionable manufacturer negligence give rise to
a cause of action to any significant degree? The answer, of course,
depends on the nature of the interest that the tort law seeks to protect.
Are crashworthiness protections designed to benefit all drivers and
passengers, even the negligent and reckless, or only those drivers and
passengers who are exercising reasonable care for themselves?
An extra wrinkle makes apportionment’s tort-proof plaintiff
more difficult to dismiss than her defamation-proof kin. The tort-proof
plaintiff in a crashworthiness case may not be the drunk driver, but rather
the innocent victim of that driver. Even when the plaintiff with the failed
4

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIAB. § 8 (2000).
See, e.g., Ellen M. Bublick, Upside Down? Terrorists, Proprietors and Civil
Responsibility for Crime Prevention in the Post-9/11 Tort-Reform World, 41 LOYOLA L. REV. 1483,
1518-28 (2008) (describing a related concern in the negligent security context).
6
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIAB. § 14 (2000).
7
See Note, The Libel-Proof Plaintiff Doctrine, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1909, 1909 (1985).
5
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airbag is the victim of the drunk driver, the plaintiff may find that, with
respect to the manufacturer, she is tort-proof.8 Actionable misconduct of
the manufacturer that causes the plaintiff injury, even severe injury, may
not afford the plaintiff any significant cause of action against the
manufacturer after responsibility has been apportioned.
This result—recognizing crashworthiness liability but then
realizing it only to the extent that the high moral blame of a drunk driver
does not lay it to rest in the apportionment process—is not prescribed by
any single legal rule, but rather stems from a combination of separate
products liability rules and comparative apportionment rules. In fact, this
combined approach appears to hold sway from the face of the three
completed projects of the Restatement (Third) of Torts.9
Yet courts concerned about preserving crashworthiness liability
have crafted a doctrine that avoids apportioning away that liability.
Specifically, in the ten years since the Restatement (Third) of Torts:
Products Liability (“Restatement Third of Products”) was adopted,
several state courts have embraced a doctrine that refuses to apportion
liability between the crashworthiness defendant and the driver who
occasioned the original crash.10
In this Article, I argue that this court-created doctrine of nonapportionment preserves the structural liability of manufacturers and
provides incentives for baseline safety protections for product users as a
whole. Courts have embraced the doctrine in two related but distinct
contexts of crashworthiness and apportionment: cases in which a drunk
driver hits the crashworthiness plaintiff and cases in which the drunk
driver is the crashworthiness plaintiff. Each context raises somewhat
different concerns and will be addressed in turn.
Although state court decisions that refuse to apportion
responsibility between those responsible for initial and secondary
collisions appear on their face to reject the Restatement (Third) of Torts,
at a deeper level, the decisions are quite consistent with Restatement
principles. In particular, the state court decisions reflect two important
types of ameliorative rules incorporated into the Restatement (Third) of
Torts: Apportionment Liability (hereinafter Restatement Third of
Apportionment) after the Restatement Third of Products was enacted—
8

See, e.g., D’Amario v. Ford Motor Co., 806 So. 2d 424, 427-28, 431-33 (Fla. 2001)
(per curium) (acknowledging that the majority view is that “the fault of the plaintiff or a third party
in causing the initial accident is recognized as a defense to a crashworthiness case against a product
manufacturer”).
9
The term “Restatement Third of Torts” refers collectively to all of the segments of the
Restatement (Third) of Torts project. As of 2008, those projects include the Restatement (Third) of
Torts: Products Liability, the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Apportionment of Liability, and the
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Physical and Emotional Harm.
10
Gianinni v. Ford Motor Co., No. 3:05CV244 (SRU), 2007 WL 3253731, at *3-*4 (D.
Conn. Nov. 2, 2007) (holding that plaintiff negligence that leads to the underlying accident should
not be available as a comparative fault defense to a crashworthiness claim); D’Amario, 806 So. 2d at
433-35 (reviewing the reasoning behind cases that do not apportion between initial causes of the
accident and crashworthiness claims and adopting the view that refusing to apportion is preferable).
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defendant “very duty” rules and plaintiff “no-duty” rules. Defendant
“very duty” rules define a defendant’s duty to use reasonable care to
protect against specific types of risk.11 Plaintiff “no-duty” rules limit
defenses of plaintiff comparative negligence based on special reasons of
principle or policy.12
Rather than urge courts to conform their decisions to the facially
applicable doctrines of the Restatement (Third) of Torts, this Article
urges the Restatement (Third) of Torts to confront more systematically
the structural accountability issues that lie at the intersection of the
Restatement projects but may have fallen in between them.
I.

PRESERVING STRUCTURAL LIABILITY: MANUFACTURER
CRASHWORTHINESS ACCOUNTABILITY TO THE VICTIM OF THE
DRUNK DRIVER

Perhaps the case that best illustrates the problem with the
Restatement (Third) of Torts approach to comparative apportionment in
crashworthiness cases is the Florida Supreme Court case, D’Amario v.
Ford Motor Co.13 That case examined two consolidated claims.14 One
was a claim filed by Maria Nash, who was driving to church with her
two children when a drunk driver crossed over the center line and
crashed head-on into her vehicle.15 Because the seatbelt in her Chevy
Corsica failed, Nash’s head struck a metal post that separated the
windshield from the driver’s door. Nash later died from her injuries.16
Nash’s estate sued General Motors, the maker of her car, for “a design
defect which had been discovered in the seatbelt of the 1990 Chevrolet
Corsica.”17
At trial against GM on the crashworthiness claim, Nash’s estate
sought to exclude evidence of the other driver’s .15 blood alcohol
content. According to the estate, the driver-intoxication information was
irrelevant and prejudicial to the jury’s consideration of comparative
fault.18 Despite the estate’s objection, the trial court ruled that the jury
should apportion responsibility between General Motors and the drunk
driver who hit Ms. Nash. Given this mandate to apportion responsibility,
the court found that the jury should be permitted to hear evidence of the
driver’s intoxication. When presented with that evidence at trial, the jury
found no liability on the part of General Motors. On appeal, the estate
11

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIAB. § 14 cmt. b (2000).
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 7 cmt. h (Proposed
Final Draft No. 1, 2005).
13
806 So. 2d 424 (Fla. 2001).
14
Id. at 426-30 (addressing the claims of Clifford Harris and Maria Nash).
15
Id. at 429.
16
Id.
17
Id.
18
Id. at 429-30.
12
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argued that the evidence of the other motorist’s intoxication had been
“unduly prejudicial to the issue of whether General Motors was negligent
in designing a defective seatbelt.”19
Before discussing the Florida Supreme Court’s disposition of the
case, it is useful to examine the Restatement (Third) of Torts approach to
the problem. That approach to apportionment in crashworthiness cases
bridges two separate segments of the Restatement (Third) of Torts
project—the Restatement Third of Products and the Restatement Third of
Apportionment.
The Restatement Third of Products adopts crashworthiness
liability of manufacturers.20 When a product is defective at the time of
commercial sale and the defect is “a substantial factor in increasing the
plaintiff’s harm beyond that which would have resulted from other
causes, the product seller is subject to liability for the increased harm.”21
In cases in which harm is caused by multiple actors, as it nearly
always is in crashworthiness cases, the Restatement Third of Products
then provides a structure for two types of apportionment. First, causal
apportionment is undertaken when proof supports a determination of the
harm that would have resulted from other causes in the absence of the
product defect.22 When causal apportionment cannot divide the harms,
the crashworthiness defendant is either jointly and severally liable or
severally liable for the harms, in accordance with the rules of the
applicable jurisdiction.23 Next, the Restatement Third of Products leaves
further apportionment of responsibility among multiple defendants to
“generally applicable rules apportioning responsibility.”24 Those
generally applicable rules of apportionment can be found in the
Restatement Third of Apportionment. The Restatement Third of
Apportionment instructs courts to apportion “responsibility” between all
causes of action—intentional, reckless, negligent or strict liability—
according to a metric that compares fault and causation.25
Given these combined rules, if a court wanted to follow the
Restatement (Third) of Torts in Nash, it would first segregate any harm
that the defendant could prove was attributable only to the drunk driver
and not the manufacturer—harm that would have occurred even if Ms.
Nash’s seatbelt had not failed. Liability for that harm would be assigned
to the drunk driver alone. Then harm caused by both the drunk driver’s
collision and the seatbelt’s failure—apparently, the plaintiff striking her
head against the car and her ultimate death from the head injury—would
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

id. § 8.

Id. at 430.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 16 cmt. a (1998).
Id. § 16(a).
Id. § 16(b).
Id. § 16(d).
Id. § 17.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIAB. § 1 cmts. b, c (2000);
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be left to local rules of joint and several or several liability. In most
jurisdictions, including Florida, several liability typically would apply.26
Accordingly, whatever percentage of the remaining responsibility was
assigned to other parties in the action, GM would not be required to pay.
With respect to the responsibility apportionment, the
Restatement Third of Apportionment would in turn advise a jurisdiction
to compare the responsibility of all actors involved in the crash, whether
strictly liable, negligent, reckless, or intentional.27 Under this approach, a
jury would be instructed to hear evidence regarding each party’s fault
and assign percentages of responsibility for the harm in turn. In this case,
the jury would assign responsibility to the drunk driver and the car
manufacturer respectively. These percentage assignments would be
required to equal 100%. The factors that the jury would be instructed to
use in its responsibility assignment include “the nature of the person’s
risk creating conduct” and “the strength of the causal connection”
between that conduct and the harm.28
After testimony, the jury might assign percentages of
responsibility to the two defendants in a few different ways. First, a jury
asked to weigh the risk-creating conduct of drunk driving against the
risk-creating conduct of negligent seatbelt design or manufacture might
assign most or all of the responsibility to the reckless drunk driver based
on a calculus of moral blame. The zero-liability ruling in Nash may have
been a result of such a comparative calculation. Of course, the reverse is
also possible. A jury could assign more responsibility to the
manufacturer responsible for the car’s defect than it did to the drunk
driver. In either scenario, the apportionment result presents some
significant problems.
If juries weight apportionments heavily toward the morally
blameworthy misconduct of drunk driving, apportionment becomes a
back-door route to eliminate crashworthiness liability in a significant
percentage of cases. Just how significant the apportionment-based
reduction might be is suggested by Center for Disease Control estimates
that drunk driving causes nearly a third of all vehicle fatalities.29 The
evisceration of crashworthiness liability in such a large percentage of
claims threatens the very purpose of imposing crashworthiness liability
as an initial matter.

26

See id. § 17, at 151-59; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.81 (West 2009).
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIAB. § 8 (2000).
28
Id.
29
NAT’L CTR. FOR STATISTICS AND ANALYSIS, NHTSA, DOT HS 810 801, TRAFFIC
SAFETY FACTS 2006 DATA: ALCOHOL IMPAIRED DRIVING 1 (2008), available at http://wwwnrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/Pubs/810801.PDF (alcohol-related traffic fatalities account for 32% of all traffic
fatalities in the United States); Ctrs. for Disease Control and Prevention, Dep’t of Health and Human
Servs., Impaired Driving, http://www.cdc.gov/ncipc/factsheets/drving.htm (last visited Apr. 2, 2009)
(noting that drugs other than alcohol are involved in 18% of motor vehicle driver deaths).
27
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The purpose of crashworthiness liability is described by the
Restatement Third of Products as follows: “[a]lthough accidents are not
intended uses of products, they are generally foreseeable. A
manufacturer has a duty to design and manufacture its product so as
reasonably to reduce the foreseeable harm that may occur in an accident
brought about by causes other than a product defect.”30 To the extent that
crashworthiness liability is designed to require manufacturers to reduce
damage in foreseeable collisions, that liability must allow for collisions
caused by drunk driving, which are constantly if tragically foreseeable.31
If apportionment eviscerates crashworthiness liability in the large
percentage of accidents caused by drunk driving, manufacturers’ duty
will demand little institutional attention. To the extent that
crashworthiness liability promotes vehicle safety, diminution of liability
may produce significant reductions in vehicle safety protections. Also,
while crashworthiness liability plus comparative apportionment might
net a no-liability or small-liability rule, the uncertain process of
apportionment may result in large litigation costs on the path to that
limited return—a lose-lose situation for manufacturers and injured
consumers.
Though sold as a means for holding manufacturers liable only
for their own fault or for the harm that they caused, apportionment does
neither. Apportionment mechanisms in drunk driving cases do not
exonerate car manufacturers based on the manufacturers’ own right
conduct, but based on the additional culpable misconduct of a drunk
driver. Imagine a driver injured by a collision in which his airbag fails to
inflate because of a product defect. The driver suffers enhanced physical
injuries valued at $100,000. If the cause of the car accident was not
negligence, perhaps bad weather, the driver might recover in full from
the manufacturer. If the accident was instead caused by another driver’s
negligent act, perhaps looking away from the roadway, the driver might
recover a portion of the damages from the manufacturer, perhaps 50%, or
$50,000. Yet if the accident was caused by a drunk driver, a large
percentage of responsibility, perhaps 90%, might be assigned to the
drunk. Consequently, the victim might recover only one tenth of any
enhanced injury from the manufacturer. In each case, the manufacturer
created the same defective product which resulted in the same enhanced
injury to the victim. In each case, the victim acted without fault. And yet,
the victim of the drunk driver, by virtue of being the victim of both a
reckless and a negligent actor, becomes tort-proof.
It might be argued that the Restatement (Third) of Torts itself did
not create the inconsistency in the previous scenario. One way to resolve
30

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 16 cmt. a (1998).
Ctrs. for Disease Control and Prevention, Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., National
Drunk and Drugged Driving Prevention Month, http://www.cdc.gov/ncipc/duip/spotlite/3d.htm (last
visited Apr. 2, 2009) (stating that three in every ten Americans will be involved in an alcohol related
crash in their lifetimes).
31
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the problem would be through state-enacted legislation embracing joint
and several liability in the case of single, indivisible harms. Yet this
argument glosses over the role the Restatement Third of Apportionment
played in dramatically magnifying the problem by adding strict liability,
recklessness, and intentional torts to the apportionment mix after several
liability was firmly established as the rule in most U.S. jurisdictions.
Adding highly blameworthy conduct to the apportionment threatens the
underlying structural liability more consistently, and to a far greater
degree, than did previous comparisons because of the high moral blame
associated with that conduct. Moreover, adding strict liability and
specifically crashworthiness liability to the apportionment calculations
broadens the possibility that liability imposed to assure structural safety
will be undermined by the apportionment process.
In the years after crashworthiness liability was adopted but
before comparative apportionment included torts beyond negligence,
juries would not have been asked to apportion responsibility between the
drunk driver and the manufacturer for either of two reasons. The first
reason was the existence of joint and several liability. However, a second
reason for absence of apportionment in these cases was the fact that
intentional and reckless torts (and even at one point strict products
liability) were not included in comparative fault systems.
Confronted with the concern that adding others’ highly
blameworthy conduct to comparative apportionment calculations will
eviscerate defendants’ duties of care, some courts have sustained jury
verdicts that assign more responsibility to the negligent or strictly liable
defendant than to the reckless or intentional tortfeasor.32 Under these
rulings, a jury in a case like Nash could say that GM had 90% of the
overall responsibility given its defective seatbelt, while the drunk driver
shared only 10% of the total. Although upholding these institution-heavy
apportionments may be a second-best solution for courts that want to
preserve structural liability,33 those counterintuitive judgments also raise
problems. In particular, allowing jurors to assign the full range of
possible percentages of responsibility in a given case can magnify
inconsistencies between the outcomes of different juries. Moreover, the
normative statement of a jury in this case seems so contrary to public
understanding of fault that the verdicts might further erode support for
the tort system. Courts of appeal must then struggle with the question of
whether such results can be justified under fault-based metrics, or
whether, perhaps, these comparative metrics can be understood in a way
that is not entirely fault-based.34

2008).

32

See, e.g., Nash v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 856 N.Y.S.2d 583, 586-88 (App. Div.

33

Bublick, supra note 5, at 1530-43.
See, e.g., Nash, 856 N.Y.S.2d at 586-88.

34
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Courts that want to retain crashworthiness liability but not face
the vagaries endemic to an “any-apportionment-calculation-goes” system
may refuse altogether to apportion responsibility in crashworthiness
cases. This is the approach ultimately taken by the Florida Supreme
Court in D’Amario. The D’Amario court held that “the principles of
comparative fault involving the causes of the first collision do not
generally apply to crashworthiness cases.”35
In reaching its determination, the court placed great weight on
the purpose of crashworthiness liability and the concern that
apportionment in this context would reduce or obliterate the defendant’s
duty.36 The court drew an analogy to medical malpractice cases, in which
an injury that occasioned the need for treatment is not apportioned with a
doctor’s subsequent negligent care.37 Finally, the court rejected the
specific argument that drunk driving falls into the state’s statutory
intentional tort exception to comparative fault; drunk driving falls short
of purpose or substantial certainty of harm—a necessary element of an
intentional tort.38 Nevertheless, the court found the intentional tort
exception analogous to the concern presented in the case of
apportionment and drunk driving.39 The court expressed concern that
without an exception to apportionment where the other defendant was a
drunk driver, defendants were “permitted to effectively shift the focus of
the trial from the existence of a defect to the driver’s conduct in driving
while intoxicated, even though the existence of a defect was the
fundamental liability issue to be tried in these cases.”40 Accordingly, the
court ruled that the trial court’s focus on the evidence of drunk driving in
Nash unduly confused the issues in the case. It therefore upheld the
intermediate court’s reversal of that ruling.41
Although the Restatement (Third) of Torts does not formally
embrace the doctrine cited in D’Amario, principles from the Restatement
(Third) of Torts lend support to that decision. The support stems from
changes to the Restatement Third of Apportionment made after the
Restatement Third of Products was adopted in 1997. At the time the
Restatement Third of Products was enacted, the Restatement Third of
Apportionment sought comparison of intentional, reckless, negligent, and
strict liability torts without any ameliorative rules to blunt the effects of
the assessment.42 The effects of unmitigated apportionment doctrines on
35

D’Amario v. Ford Motor Co., 806 So.2d 424, 441 (Fla. 2001).
Id. at 434.
37
Id. at 436-37.
38
Id. at 438-39.
39
Id. at 439 n.15.
40
Id. at 441.
41
Id. at 441-42.
42
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIAB. 9-23 (Proposed
Changes to Proposed Final Draft, 1998) (proposing to “[i]nsert the following new section [24.1]”
entitled “Tortfeasors with a Specific Duty to Protect the Plaintiff From an Intentional Tort”).
36
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substantive tort law subsequently became a flashpoint of controversy
surrounding the Restatement Third of Apportionment. Although that
Restatement had endeavored to leave “‘first-order’ questions involving
the basic rules of liability” out of the Restatement and address only
“second-order” questions of apportionment, the Reporters conceded that
the “line between first-order and second-order issues has been difficult to
maintain.”43
Consequently, the Reporters subsequently crafted additional
black letter rules to preserve “first-order” rules of substantive liability.
One of the most important of these ameliorative rules protected
negligence liability in cases involving highly blameworthy intentional
tortfeasor defendants. In particular, Restatement Third of Apportionment
section 14 made tortfeasors jointly and severally liable for “failure to
protect the [plaintiff] from the specific risk of an intentional tort.”44
Under this rule, for example, if a defendant’s duty was to provide
adequate security to prevent a criminal attack, the defendant that
provided negligent security could not apportion responsibility against the
criminal assailant.
The Restatement Reporters justified this rule on the ground that
application of comparative responsibility in the context of intentional
tortfeasors and several liability creates “a difficult problem.”45
Specifically, “the great culpability of the intentional tortfeasor may lead
a factfinder to assign the bulk of responsibility for the harm to the
intentional tortfeasor,” leaving the negligent tortfeasor with little liability
and the injured plaintiff with little compensation.46
Because the rule is limited to intentional torts, section 14 would
not directly address the problem of drunk driving. Moreover, to the
extent that the Restatement Third of Apportionment’s ameliorative rule is
premised on an intentional tortfeasor’s likely insolvency, the context of
drunk driving may differ because some forms of insurance coverage may
be available. Nevertheless, as the Florida Supreme Court noted, the
concern for apportionment in the context of intentional torts shares many
similar facets with the concern about apportionment in the context of
drunk driving. Specifically, courts are appropriately concerned that the
second-order rules of apportionment will have too great an effect on the
first-order issues of crashworthiness liability.
The Restatement Third of Apportionment itself acknowledges
that the ameliorative rule for intentional torts might appropriately stretch
beyond the intentional torts context. Specifically, Restatement Third of
Apportionment commentary suggests that there may be situations in
43

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIAB. § 1, Reporters’ Note

cmt. a (2000).
44
45
46

Id. § 14.
Id. § 14 cmt b.
Id.
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which courts “extend the rule stated in this Section to those who fail to
protect against less than intentional tortious conduct.”47 Apropos of the
concern that drunk driving might present a case of high moral blame akin
to an intentional tort, the Restatement Third of Apportionment lists
negligent-entrustment and dram-shop liability in its list of potential
extensions to the category.
Yet while adoption of the D’Amario ruling and an extension of
Restatement Third of Apportionment section 14 would lead to similar
results in the Nash case, the two approaches would yield somewhat
different answers in other instances. Specifically, D’Amario would
prevent apportionment in crashworthiness law regardless of the cause of
the initial accident. That would preclude apportionment between a drunk
driver and the car company in Nash, but it would also preclude
apportionment between a careless driver and the car maker. As such,
apportionment would be barred not only when it might eviscerate
crashworthiness liability, but when it might merely reduce it. Also, under
D’Amario, evidence of intoxication would be irrelevant to the case
because no apportionment between the parties would be required. Under
an extension of the Restatement Third of Apportionment Rule 14, on the
other hand, a multi-party apportionment would still be made. However,
under Restatement Rule 14, after the apportionment, the negligent
defendant might be jointly and severally liable for the harm indivisibly
caused by the manufacturer’s defect and the drunk driver’s misconduct.48
This latter approach of the Restatement might be easier to apply in the
context of a multiple-party action.49 It also might better address the
concern that apportioning between initial and second collisions is more
of a legal fiction than a real description of separate injuries.50
Although these two solutions to the problem of preserving
crashworthiness liability in cases of drunk driving are attractive, other
solutions are equally plausible. For example, a special exception to
apportionment rules might be designed for crashworthiness cases, which
almost always involve another underlying accident. A different option
would be to fix manufacturer reductions for the other driver’s fault at a
constant percentage (as is done in cases involving driver failure to wear a
seatbelt) or at a set dollar amount.51 The dollar amount option might be
particularly attractive given auto insurance coverage, which tends to have
determinable award limits. Still another approach would be to adopt a
guidelines system under which the manufacturer’s crashworthiness
47

Id. § 14, Reporters’ Note cmt. a.
Id.
49
See, e.g., Bearint ex rel Bearint v. Dorel Juvenile Group, Inc., 389 F.3d 1339, 1346
(11th Cir. 2004); Polisano v. General Motors Corp., 744 A.2d 679 (N. J. Super. 2000).
50
Dannenfelser v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 370 F. Supp. 2d 1091, 1094 (D. Hawaii 2005)
(“[T]he line between injuries caused by the primary collision and the secondary collision is rarely so
clear as to permit a bright-line exclusion.”).
51
OWEN ET AL., MADDEN & OWEN ON PRODUCTS LIABILITY 1116-18 (3d ed. 2000).
48
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liability might be reduced or expanded by various percentages based on
mitigating and exaggerating factors concerning the manufacturer’s own
misconduct, not based on any necessary relationship with the misconduct
of another defendant. Finally, if comparisons are made, those
comparisons might be less anchored to moral blame, and the importance
of structural liability explained to the jury (as the Restatement suggests
in a related context).52
It is impossible to fully evaluate the many options for
ameliorative doctrines in this Article. However, cases like D’Amario, and
doctrines developed to alleviate the effects of apportionment on
substantive doctrines, create an effective method to preserve structural
liability in the crashworthiness context and highlight the need for further
review of methods of maintaining structural accountability.
II.

DEFINING THE BASELINE DUTY OF CARE: CRASHWORTHINESS
LIABILITY TO THE DRUNK DRIVER

The more difficult case for preserving crashworthiness liability is
not when the crashworthiness plaintiff is hit by a drunk driver, but when
the crashworthiness plaintiff is the drunk driver. Such was the case in
Giannini v. Ford Motor Co.53 In Giannini, the plaintiff was leaving a
restaurant. Although subject to dispute, Giannini claimed that despite
pressing the brake pedal, her vehicle accelerated uncontrollably,
slamming into a concrete barrier and a lamp post. Giannini also claimed
that the seatbelt she was wearing failed to restrain her in the crash,
causing her injuries. Ford disputed the plaintiff’s story. It claimed instead
that Giannini did not depress the brake pedal. Furthermore, Ford
maintained that Giannini either was not wearing her seat belt or would
have suffered the same injuries even if the seatbelt had not failed.
Finally, Ford claimed that Giannini’s alcohol consumption that night
contributed to the accident.54
In a products liability action against Ford, the District Court of
Connecticut granted Ford’s motion for summary judgment with respect
to the brake system’s alleged failure to function properly. However, the
trial court found sufficient evidence to preserve plaintiff’s claim that the
seatbelt had malfunctioned in the crash. At the pretrial conference in the
case, Ford proposed that it would present evidence at trial of the
plaintiff’s intoxication that led to the single-car accident. The court
examined the issue closely—should evidence of plaintiff fault in causing
the initial accident be a defense in a crashworthiness case?55

52
53
54
55

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PRODS. LIAB. § 16 cmt. f (1998).
No. 3:05CV244, 2007 WL 3253731 (D. Conn. Nov. 2, 2007).
Id. at *1.
Id. at *1-*4.
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This issue, whether plaintiff fault was a valid defense to a
crashworthiness claim, was also an important if controversial issue
addressed in the Restatement Third of Products. The answer to the
question varied in different drafts of the project. The initial Restatement
Third of Products embraced the view that a crashworthiness defendant
owed a duty of care to even negligent or reckless drivers. Accordingly,
although plaintiff fault would reduce plaintiff recovery in most types of
products liability actions, plaintiff fault would not reduce the plaintiff’s
recovery in a crashworthiness case.56 When a car manufacturer had an
obligation to create a crashworthy vehicle, a jury might find that the
obligation was met or not met. However, why the plaintiff driver got into
the accident in the first place—an icy road, talking on a cell phone, or
driving drunk—wouldn’t enter into the assignment of liability and
damages against the manufacturer, at least with respect to the enhanced
portion of the injury.57
The theory underlying the Restatement Third of Products initial
position was that “the requirement that an automobile be reasonably
crashworthy” called for a different rule with respect to plaintiff fault
defenses.58 “[I]f the risks created by plaintiff’s conduct are within the
range that justifies crashworthiness protection, plaintiff’s conduct creates
the very situation in which the plaintiff has a legitimate right to expect
the automobile to provide reasonable protection.”59 Accordingly, the
initial draft of the Restatement Third of Products would ignore plaintiff
fault even though the situation might trouble courts “who find it
objectionable that drunken drivers or drug abusers be allowed full
recovery for increased harm.”60
The position that the Reporters originally espoused on
crashworthiness and apportionment was subsequently overruled by a
motion on the floor of the ALI.61 The motion was introduced and
supported by a member of the defense bar.62 However, the Reporters of
the Restatement Third of Apportionment also recommended backing
away from the original rule.63 In light of the carried motion to amend the
draft, the Restatement Third of Products changed course to provide,
contrary to its original recommendation, that “the contributory fault of
the plaintiff in causing an accident that results in defect-related increased
harm [be] relevant in apportioning responsibility between or among the
parties, according to applicable apportionment law.”64 In commentary,
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 6 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1994).
Id.
Id. § 6 cmt. f.
Id.
Id.
71 A.L.I. PROC. 203-14 (1994).
OWEN ET AL., supra note 51, at 1105.
Id. at 206.
Id.
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the Restatement Third of Products acknowledges that this is a
particularly “difficult issue” and the subject of a “sharp[] split” between
jurisdictions.65 In a nod to that difficulty, the Restatement Third of
Products lists as an important factor to the apportionment that a
crashworthiness requirement “aims to protect persons in circumstances in
which they are unable to protect themselves.”66
In Giannini, the Connecticut District Court cited the final rules
adopted by the Restatement Third of Products and noted the split of
authority discussed in that document. But while citing the final
Restatement Third of Products rules, the court adopted the Restatement
Third of Products’ initial view—that plaintiff negligence leading to the
underlying accident should not be available as a comparative fault
defense to the enhanced portion of the injury. Tracking the Restatement
Third of Products’ original sentiment, the Giannini court reasoned that
the crashworthiness doctrine presupposes that injuries will occur. In fact,
the court viewed the duty to protect against enhanced injuries as an
outgrowth of the inevitability of operator negligence.67 In light of
foreseeable collisions, “a manufacturer’s duty is that of minimizing the
injurious effects of contact however caused.”68 Given that definition of
the defendant’s duty, the court limited the trier of fact’s analysis “to the
nature and severity of the contact and the object’s response.”69 This focus
on the crashworthiness issue, not on the origin of the crash, stems from
the underlying principle that “[a] negligent operator is entitled to the
same protection against unnecessary injury as the careful user of the
same product is entitled.”70
Ironically, in the ten years since the Restatement Third of
Products was enacted, most of the courts that have cited final
Restatement Third of Products section 16(f) have not embraced the
Reporters’ final position.71 A number of recent cases have held that the
manufacturer’s duty in a crashworthiness case encompasses care for all
drivers or that evidence of the cause of the initial injury is irrelevant to
the enhanced injury case.72 However, while the majority of cases decided
65

(1998).

66

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 16, Reporters’ Note, cmt. f

Id. § 16 cmt. f.
Ford v. Gianinni, Civil Action No. 3:05cv244, 2007 WL 3253731, at *3-*4 (D. Conn.
Nov. 2, 2007).
68
Id. at *3.
69
Id.
70
Id.
71
See id.; Polisano v. General Motors Corp., 744 A.2d 679 (N. J. Super. 2000); Norwest
Bank New Mexico, N.A. v. Chrysler Corp., 981 P.2d 1217 (N.M. Ct. App. 1999). But see Davis v.
Daimler Chrysler Corp., No. HHDX04CV065015721S, 2009 WL 323428 (Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 12,
2009).
72
See, e.g., Bearint ex rel Bearint v. Dorel Juvenile Group, Inc., 389 F.3d 1339, 1346
(11th Cir. 2004) (stating that “allowing a jury to allocate some of the fault to the initial tortfeasor
would partially and unfairly absolve the manufacturer of liability for making a faulty device”); Ricci
v. AB Volvo, 106 Fed. App’x 573, 574 (9th Cir. 2004); Black v. M & W Gear Co., 269 F.3d 1220,
67
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after the Restatement Third of Products was passed adopt the Reporters’
original view, some cases have embraced the view taken in the final
Restatement Third of Products.73
Again, on one level, the courts’ decisions not to allow plaintiff
comparative fault defenses conflict with the Restatement (Third) of
Torts’ formal position. However, at a deeper level, the decisions can be
seen as a reflection of principles embraced by the Restatement (Third) of
Torts. In particular, subsequent doctrines from the Restatement Third of
Apportionment and the Restatement Third of Physical and Emotional
Harm suggest limits on the view that plaintiff comparative fault must
always serve as a defense. In particular, subsequent Restatement Third of
Physical and Emotional Harm provisions adopt “plaintiff no-duty rules”
rules that bar plaintiff comparative fault defenses in light of special
reasons of principle or policy.74
A plaintiff with a high level of fault, such as a drunk driver,
whose conduct might appropriately be sanctioned in any number of
ways, would seem an unlikely prospect for special reasons of principle or
policy to bar a comparative fault defense. Why might the tort law
recognize an interest in allowing a highly blameworthy plaintiff to
recover from a product manufacturer?
A previous examination of cases in which state courts bar
plaintiff comparative fault claims after the turn to comparative fault
defenses suggests that courts limit plaintiff fault defenses based on six
different types of principle or policy considerations.75 Two of these
policy rationales are particularly salient in the context of a drunk driver’s
crashworthiness claim.
First, courts sometimes limit plaintiff fault defenses in structural
safety cases—when systemic differentials in knowledge, experience, or
control suggest that the defendant can take better care of the plaintiff’s
safety than can the plaintiff herself. The cases involve defendants who
can foresee that some people in plaintiff’s position will not exercise
adequate self-care, and the defendants can control system-wide decisions
to ensure greater safety for the group.
In the crashworthiness cases, barring plaintiff comparative fault
claims may well promote greater driver and passenger safety. While
driving under the influence of alcohol is dangerous and distressing,
1236 (10th Cir. 2001); Gianinni v. Ford Motor Co., No. 3:05CV244 (SRU), 2007 WL 3253731, at
*3-*4 (D. Conn. Nov. 2, 2007); Dannenfelser v. Daimler Chrysler Corp., 370 F. Supp. 2d 1091,
1095 (D. Haw. 2005); Green v. General Motors, 709 A.2d 205 (N.J. Super. 1998); see also OWEN ET
AL., supra note 51, at 1106 n.33 (citing a trial court opinion of Judge Posner’s).
73
See, e.g., Smith v. Toyota Motor Corp., 105 Fed. App’x 47, 50 (6th Cir. 2004); Davis,
2009 WL 323428; Bravo v. Ford Motor Co., 29 Conn. L. Rptr. 676 (Conn. Super. 2001).
74
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYSICAL HARM § 7 (Proposed Final Draft No. 1,
2005); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIAB. § 3; see, e.g., Christensen v.
Royal School Dist. No. 160, 124 P.3d 283 (Wash. 2005) (employing plaintiff no duty rules in the
context of a teen victim of sexual abuse).
75
Bublick, supra note 3, at 989-90.
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accidents from that conduct are certainly foreseeable. In fact, impaired
driving is the single greatest risk factor for injury-producing automobile
accidents.76 Given the great foreseeable risk and the defendant’s control
over systemic safety decisions about driver and passenger protection,
courts may feel that efforts to heighten plaintiff care through comparative
fault defenses might be counterproductive to driver and passenger safety
by undermining more important incentives for defendant care. 77
Another policy factor that courts have recognized as a limit on
comparative fault defenses is one related to the role of the defendant. At
times, even when defendants are not better situated than are plaintiffs to
provide care for plaintiffs’ safety, courts may limit plaintiff fault
defenses so that defendants cannot litigate away contractual or social
obligations of care for even a faulty plaintiff. In this category, limits are
placed on defendants’ use of comparative fault defenses in order to set
baseline levels of care owed to even plaintiffs guilty of wrongdoing.
Often, these cases involve a plaintiff’s right to receive subsequent aid.
This sort of principle and policy limit may apply to
crashworthiness cases with drunk drivers. A person who drinks and
drives may legitimately face many types of adverse consequences. The
driver might have her driver’s license revoked, get into an accident and
be jailed, be fined or required to pay tort damages, or be injured or killed
herself. But even with all of these potential consequences, the drunk
driver may still have some entitlements to care from others. For example,
doctors must provide adequate emergency care,78 which may not be
negligent.79 Moreover, police may not abuse the driver.80
A manufacturer’s obligation to provide crashworthiness
protection appears to fit within this category of subsequent protection
owed to an even negligent or reckless person. The clearest analogy may
be to a doctor’s obligation to provide non-negligent care to patients who
were injured by their own fault. In the medical context, if a patient
causes his own injury by drunk driving, a doctor cannot assert the
plaintiff’s negligence in causing the accident as a basis for a comparative
fault claim in an action for subsequent malpractice.81
76

See supra notes 29, 31 and accompanying text.
See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 65, at 452 (W. Page
Keeton ed., 5th ed. 1984) (“It has been said that . . . the rule [of contributory negligence] is intended
to discourage accidents by denying recovery to those who fail to use proper care for their own safety.
But the assumption that the speeding motorist is, or should be meditating on the possible failure of a
lawsuit for his possible injuries appears contrary to human experience; and it might be as reasonable
to say that the rule promotes accidents by encouraging the negligent defendant to hope that the
person he injures will be negligent too.”).
78
Lewellen v. Schneck Med. Ctr., No. 4:05-CV-00083-JDT-WGH, 2007 WL 2363384,
at *5 (S.D. Ind. Aug. 16, 2007).
79
Mercer v. Vanderbilt Univ., 134 S.W.3d 121, 130 (Tenn. 2004); RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIAB. § 7 cmt. m (2000).
80
See City of Hobbs v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 162 F.3d 576, 579 (10th Cir. 1998)
(comparative fault does not apply to section 1983 action).
81
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIAB. § 7 cmt. m (2000).
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The special rule excluding comparative-fault defenses in these
cases can be understood in part by the nature of the duty to provide
rescue protections that could not be waived by contract. A thought
experiment might be useful here. Imagine that a car dealer knows that
five of its cars have airbags that have a high risk of failing to open on
impact in a collision. Anticipating potential liability but not wanting to
pay for repairs, the dealer decides to sell the defective cars only to people
known to be alcoholics because with comparative fault, the damage
payouts will be slight. Would the dealer be permitted to make such a
calculation?
Even if the dealer gave adequate disclosure of the defect to the
specific purchasers, such a decision would violate the dealer’s legal and
contractual obligations. Laws requiring car makers to provide airbags in
all cars after a certain date are designed to minimize injuries to drivers
and passengers as a whole, not only to careful drivers.
Similarly, a doctor could not tell a patient that she was going to
exercise less care than she would for other patients because of the
patient’s prior carelessness for her own health. The policy interest here is
in providing a level of care to all patients, not just those who have
occasioned their injuries and illnesses without fault.
Plaintiff no-duty rules may not have been applied to comparative
fault claims in crashworthiness cases in part because these rules were not
well-developed or defined at the time the Restatement Third of Products
was enacted. There is no reason that plaintiff no-duty rules could not be
used to reach the result reached by the court in Giannini. If plaintiff noduty rules are applied, the plaintiff may recover in full from the
manufacturer for the crashworthiness case.
But the potential for adopting plaintiff no-duty rules to the
crashworthiness and drunk driving context is not an open-and-shut case.
The shift to comparative fault from contributory negligence not only
undermines but was meant to undermine all-or-nothing results.82 With
both parties in the case at fault to some degree, contemporary norms
suggest some form of splitting.
While splitting is plausible in theory, the history of
apportionment cases in this area provides less reassurance that splitting is
a feasible option. In practice, when courts ask juries to apportion
responsibility between a crashworthiness defendant and a drunk driver,
comparison of the two types of conduct seems generally to resemble a
no-liability rule for the crashworthiness defendant.83 Even if a product
defect causes injury to the plaintiff, when faced with the moral
blameworthiness of a drunk driver, it is not clear that juries can balance
structural safety interests in maintaining crashworthy vehicles with moral
blame for drunk drivers. Instead, the many 100-0 results in cases
82
83

See id. § 3 cmt. b.
See, e.g., D’Amario v. Ford Motor Co., 806 So. 2d 424, 437 (Fla. 2002) (per curiam).
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involving one highly blameworthy party suggests that plaintiff’s highly
blameworthy conduct may swamp all other factors.84
In essence then, when juries compare a plaintiff’s reckless
conduct and a defendant’s failure to design a crashworthy vehicle, the
plaintiff may well be tort-proof. This is true even though the injuries are
not, in the words of one famous case, “entirely” the fault of the
plaintiff.85 For courts that want to preserve some crashworthiness liability
even to reckless parties, comparative apportionment becomes a poor
option. Plaintiff no-duty rules, or the equivalent doctrine, refusing to
apportion fault between the causes of the first and second collision,
preserves a more robust doctrine of crashworthiness liability.
There are other viable options for creating a real split solution.
One would be to proceed as seatbelt cases do, with fixed percentage
reductions for plaintiff fault. However, this sort of compromise would
have to be drawn by legislative solution. Given political currents,
however, plaintiffs may not receive anything under these statutes either.86
A different option would be to allow reckless plaintiffs to obtain
full recovery in cases involving manufacturing defects, which are often
more clear in terms of wrongs done to the plaintiff, and an apportioned
(or typically zero recovery) in design defect cases.
CONCLUSION
The Restatement Third of Products has now turned ten. In terms
of the project’s contribution to products liability defenses, there is much
to celebrate. The project’s framework of causal and then fault
apportionment is conceptually clear and analytically sound.87 The
disappearance of special defenses like misuse promises to simplify
adjudication.88 The removal of disclaimers as a bar to liability reduces
manufacturers’ ability to waive liability to uninformed consumers who,
for the most part, do not consciously choose added product risk.89 And
where fault lines emerge in the case law, the Reporters not only mark
those hazards, but supply cogent explanations of the various routes that
might be taken.
84

Richard C. Ausness, Products Liability’s Parallel Universe: Fault-Based Liability
Theories and Modern Products Liability Law, 74 BROOK. L. REV. 635 (2009) (discussing ways in
which courts avoid comparative apportionment and revert to all-or-nothing solutions when plaintiffs
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Butterfield v. Forrester, (1809) 103 Eng. Rep. 926, 927 (K.B.) (U.K.).
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See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 337.195 (West 2006).
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RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. §§ 16, 17 (1998).
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DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 370, at 1026-29 (2000).
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As Mark Geistfeld shows in the context of products liability and Ken Simons
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Yet, as this round of celebrations ends, a wish for the future
seems in order. After ten years of case law following the Restatement
Third of Products and a more complete Restatement (Third) of Torts
project, it is time to reexamine how structural liability can survive the
advent of comparative apportionment’s inclusion of highly blameworthy
torts. Crashworthiness cases with drunk drivers are the first example.
In part, the need for reexamination of the structural liability issue
stems from the fragmentary nature of the Restatement (Third) of Torts
project. From the beginning of the project, the American Law Institute
made an important decision that the subject of Torts had “become too
broad and too intricate to be encompassed in a single project.”90 The
decision to proceed in “segments” was pragmatic, perhaps essential to
the project’s completion.91 But now that three segments are complete—
the Restatement Third of Products in 1998,92 the Restatement Third of
Apportionment in 2000,93 and the Restatement Third of Physical and
Emotional Harm, likely in this coming year94—questions of fit remain.
If the Restatement (Third) of Torts meant to obliterate structural
liability it could have staked this position in an outright claim. But it will
be unfortunate if this is truly the way crashworthiness liability ends, not
with a bang but a whimper.
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